20 October 1962 Sino Indian Conflict

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1962

I was too young and too junior at that time to pas any judgment on any one . Even though I wrote Letters from Border as a brigadier it is from the point of view of a Captain, without taking the benefit of hindsight.I quote from the preface BLS

I have endeavoured to narrate the factual accounts of the events along with my personal feelings and impressions culled from the sketchy diary,

now in tatters after forty years, that I had kept to fill my lonely hours at Towang away from my young wife.

…….


I do confess that my reflections are that of a young Captain, fleeting in nature. I saw little, understood less and heard only bits and pieces of conversation between the commanders and staff. This in a way was a blessing in disguise; it left me unawares of the dangers to life and limb. Ignorance and lack of experience of war can be of advantage at times, leaving one free to concentrate on the task in hand.


Being the Signals officer of the brigade did help me in the perception of the events as they unfolded rapidly and had become totally distorted due to the unreal atmosphere prevailing. It was a make believe war till 20thOctober, when suddenly it became real with a devastating suddenness and catastrophic effect.

Notwithstanding this, I still saw, heard and understood more than any other officer of my rank at that time. Being the Sparrow (Code for Signal officer) of the Brigade, all messages passed under my eyes. ….in addition my proximity to the Commander and Staff and the constant stream of visitors to Towang also helped.
 
One Need to Honest with His/Her Profession

Niranjan Prasad lives in NODA,He had no authority during the whole of OP Leghorn, It was Kaul who had browbeaten every one from the poor major, the BM of the 7 Brigade, moved the brigade in to the valley of death with out the knowledge of The Commander. Kaul was also responsible for the Death of Maj Choudhry and other brave solders of 9 Punjab for the failed operation against the Chinese on 10th October. Yes Prasad could have resigned, a difficult proposition for a solder Bls

Dear Sir,

While it is interesting to know the perception of a young Signal Officer, we are analyzing the actions that took place and lessons one can learn from them.

1. I don't agree with the statement that "Niranjan Prasad had no authority during the whole OP Leghorn". If GOC does not have the authority, then I wonder who would? I have seen a spineless GOC during my own career and I did give him a food for thought as a Brigage Major, that I shall talk a little later. Guess what, he could not harm me.

2. While Gen Kaul would have done what he did, it was the responsibility of the GOC to protect his men. If he did not do that for whatever reasons, he was not competent enough to be there in first place.

3. The irony is that we had him again 3 years later to repeat his incompetence if I may say so.
 
Col Sahib

I would like to share with you all that Colonel Hoshiar Singh Dahia PVC was never promoted to the rank of a Brigadier( could be on fitness grounds) but retired as a colonel and probably had settled in jaipur. He died in 1998 and was cremated in the school grounds of his native village Sisana. You are right, he was a good volleyball player and had represented Punjab University. Legendary Volleyball player Mehar Singh was his younger brother. In fact Village Sisana has given many International volleyball players including Mahabir singh who had captained Indian Team.

Please follow the link:

www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98dec09/chd.htm


with regards

sateypal
 
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1962

what to say of the GOC even the Corps Commender 33 Corps Lt Gen Umrao Sing was sacked for insisting that the task given to the brigade to throw out the Chinese was beyond its current capabilities. That is why Kaul was appointed. Yes the GOC 4 Div could have resigned,but how does one feel about resigning while in field ,possibly only those who have faced such situations can better say. BLS
 
If one may explore this :

Much of the information we have is quite general-

The brigade was given an impossible task.

There was no direction from the high command. There was no logistical backup.

The brigade was then abandoned, and 3000 lives sacrificed..
.
The battle of Namka Chu took place on 20th October 1962. The battle was over the same day.

There is no question of the bravery of our troops, who performed well, under fire.

There does not appear to any detailed account of the battle, that I can find.

If Gen. Lakshman Singh is willing, one would like to have a detailed account of the battle, seen through his eyes, and he was at the epicentre.- the eye of the storm.

Chronology, The build up, March to the Valley, Siting of HQ, etc etc switch from Offensive to Defensive action, Defence preparations, withdrawal, etc


Ravi Chaudhary
 
62

As and when you receive m book from the distributor possibly some of the questions raised by you will be answered. i suggest you read Himalayan Blunder by Brig Dalvi the commander of the brigade.Possibly the two books ,one by a capt and the other by a brig, read together may complete the picture bLS
 
Dear Amit Ji,


45 years have passed since 1962. There will always be different versions of the account from different people. That is why you call a phrase " The war as I saw it"? There will always be different perceptions. The one of Intelligence Officer of an Infantry Bn would be different than of a Commanding Officer of the Bn. Similary it will be different of a Signal Officer and Arty OP than a Infantry Company Commander or a Tank Regiment's Squadren Commander.

This is from the perspective of a Jawan of 2 Rajput BLS

The scene now shifts to the 20th Morning when the Chinese launched a massive attack on the 7 Inf Brigade.

Bhairon Singh continues, I was part of a three men patrol which had gone out on the night of 19th and we had returned to our company location say at about 3 AM, we had made tea and were resting, it was still dark when the Chinese firing started.

The company was deployed with the number one platoon well forward, right on the river line, number two on the left. The no three platoon alongwith the Company HQ was right at the back. Lt Ravi Sahib, who had taken over the command from Mangat Sahib at the time of the company taking defensive position and Subedar Phool Singh the Company JCO were in the company HQ.

Heavy firing continued, after about one hour Ravi Sahib came down to the number one platoon location. We were deployed right on the river line with the Chinese on the other side, so near to us that a strong man likes me could easily lob a grenade at them. We were still in bunkers and there were not many casualties as yet. ‘Fire the moment you see the enemy, don’t fire at random’. Ravi Sahib told the jawans.

At about 8 AM, I was called by Ravi Sahib. He ordered me to go to Bn HQ and bring verbal orders from the CO. The company was now cut-off from the Bn HQ and none of the communication links were working. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ had been cut earlier by the Chinese, the Radio was also not through (The Signals bunker at the Bn HQ had already been destroyed due to Chinese fire) He also sent a young boy, Govind Singh to accompany me. Even before we could get out of the company-defended locality, a mortar bomb landed directly on Govind Singh killing him on the spot. Now I was left alone and was on my own.

On reaching the Bn HQ what do I see : After all the men of his protection platoon had been killed Rikh Sahib had carried three LMG’s in side his bunker along with all the ammunition. Keeping his pistol aside he would, fill, load and fire the LMG’s him-self. He should have been awarded the PVC; there is no justice in this world. If some one will ask me I will tell him all about Rikh Sahib. To this I (Author) responded by the question to him that the book written by Maj Gen Verma does not mention this.
‘Sir No one ever asked me. No JCO or Officer knows as much about Rikh Sahib as I do because I was on the ground and no one else had reached there till then those who wish can say any thing they want.’
He continued, behind the CO’s Command Post there was a cutting and the Chinese were attacking from there from the rear. The attack did not come from the front, the riverside, but from the rear. He had turned the LMG around and was firing at the Chinese. There was fog and it had also started to snow the low visibility making it difficult for the Chinese to pinpoint from where the fire was coming. I was also finding it difficult to locate Rikh Sahib and reach near him. I had taken position. Now only one LMG was firing. Ultimately the Chinese fired a burst aiming at the muzzle flash of the LMG, smashing his right arm. Undaunted he continued to still fill the magazine with his left hand and also fire by the same hand. He had not fallen down and was still standing.
By that time a Chinese soldier had crawled up to the bunker and he lobed a grenade in the bunker. I had also reached near by this time. There was a hissing sound from the grenade, Rikh Sahib caught hold of the grenade and threw it out side. It needs courage to do what he did. As you know, you are a senior officer (author) one is scared of even touching a grenade. The grenade burst before hitting the ground and one splinter hit Rikh Sahib breaking his Jaw and he fell down. The Chinese now approached the bunker, angry that this particular man had inflicted the maximum damage to them they dragged him, he was not wearing the badges of rank, out of the bunker pulling him by his legs. What I am telling is the reality, the facts no one knows as much about the incident as I do. Because of the casualties they had suffered at the hands of Rikh Sahib the Chinese were furious and tried to bayonet him. Luckily he escaped, as he was about to be bayoneted, I fired and the bullet went through the hand of the Chinese who fell ahead of Rikh Sahib with the bayonet missing him. By this time some of our men and Maj Gurdial Singh Sahib, the 2 IC, were also being escorted to the same place as prisoners. Seeing him, I started shouting loudly ‘Commanding Officer ko mar rahain hain.’(They are killing the Commanding officer) Gurdial Singh Sahib came running others had not yet reached there, even though his hands were tied. He stood with his two feet astride Rick Sahib lying injured on the ground. ‘ If you want to shoot, shoot me, he is already injured what is the purpose of shooting him’ said Gurdial Singh Sahib in an emotionally charged voice. By that time a senior Chinese officer has also arrived there. There was some discussion between him and Gurdial Singh in English, some heated words were also exchange but ultimately the Chinese cooled down and asked ‘What do you want’. Gurdial Singh ‘We want to carry him, he is our CO’. The Chinese officer acceded to the request. Gurdial Singh Sahib shouted towards me in a loud voice ‘You go back and tell your Company Commander to move to the location of the company (1/9 GR) deployed near the Bde HQ on the mountain side join them and fight along them’
 
BLS ji, bahut aacha likhya hai apne.

I have also written the summary out of a book read on 1962 war by Neville Maxwell (who was South Asian correspondent of The Times). Here is the link of thread for you to go through ...

http://www.jatland.com/forums/showthread.php?t=9803

1962 INDO CHINA WAR​


Recently I gone through some papers and India’s China War by Neville Maxwell (who was South Asian correspondent of The Times) from IIM library published in 1970. By this I came to know that it was a total failure of Indian policies.

Here is the summary of the whole instances that lead to the collision.

Instead going directly to the War part, first let us clear the issues. What were the issues that lead to War?

1. Aksai Chin. (It is the No-Mans land beyond Ladhakh)
2. NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) which is the part Of Arunachal pardesh and above it.


India and China were both having claims on these two parts. Aksai Chin is on the western part and NEFA is on the eastern.

What is the history of these two areas? And whom claim is stronger?

First Aksai Chin, this is the no mans land of white rocks and a plateau 17000 feet above sea level where nothing grows and no one lives under the killing winds. An ancient route lay across it; in brief summer when for few hours only the ice melts and the caravans of Yalks crossed it from Sinkiang to Tibet carrying silk ,salt and wool. So it was the no mans land having an old way to move from the Eastern Tibet to the Western Part of Tibet to Khotan. In 1846-47, Maharaja Gulab Singh who was put on the Muslim and Sikh people of Kashmir as Raja by the British invaded Ladakh and he captured up to the Mansarover lake and to the Spiti River and British asked him to stop there. At that time Russia was the main threat in that reason for the British and they don’t want the Russians to stop beyond the China to protect the plains of India those were the main source of income to British. For this British played a tactics and had friendly relations with the weak govt. of china that time and used this region as the buffer region.

Several British went to this area to make the boundary line and each of them proposed their own lines e.g. W.H Johnson. The British kept on changing the maps depending on the situation in that region and in 1842 they showed it in their territory and in 50’s again left it, in 1877 Atlas they showed it again under them and again till 1914, it was left to please China. As in 1914 the Chinese Govt. was very loose and Tibet became sovereign region, British again claimed that region and also now Tibet was under British but only for the foreign policies.

In 1842 when British did a treaty with the Tibet officials and not with the Chinese govt. regarding the Western region and they forced the Tibet officials to keep it under British Territory. But the Chinese govt. had never accepted that treaty at all.

Now for the NEFA region, The Nepal and Bhutan both were having their own Rule but they were bound to the British for their Foreign policies. Sikkim and Darjeeling were taken by the British from Tibet because of their climate and natural beauty. There is Tawang having a great Monastery and Buddhist population overall in that region full of thick forests and here in 1844 British restrict themselves at Udalguri that is lower down the hills of Tawang region. Again here British didn’t invade so as to please the Chinese. In this region also survey’s done. There were two boundaries proposed one is at the foot of the hills and the other one was above. British were angry at the killing of Noel Williamson by the tribes and also when in may 1910 Chinese occupied Rima which is at the right uppermost corner of Arunachal. They decided to occupy up to outer boundary but that also was not having Tawang under it. Later MacMohan in 1914 surveyed that area and proposed the boundary that is shown in the Indian maps these days and also known as MacMohan line. And After the fall of Chinese govt. in 1914 and arise of the Tibet as a sovereign region British again had a treaty with the Tibet officials now for the NEFA and they agreed upon the MacMohan line to be the boundary. The Tawang region as it was totally Tibetian by people, Culture and geographically also so in 1938 Atlas, British showed it as part of Tibet. Here one thing to be noted that Chinese govt. was never agreed upon this new marking of the region and claims that area up till foot hills to be its own but due to week govt. they couldn’t did anything.

At the time of Indian freedom, India got Tibet which was dependent on India for her foreign policies, same as Bhutan.

People’s Republic of china was established on 1st Oct. 1950 and soon after that they announced attack on Tibet and to take it under china again. Here comes the week policy of Nehru first time, Indian Ambassador in Tibet K.M Pannikar had exchanged files with the Chinese there and Chinese soon take over Tibet. That time Truman even asked Nehru to provide all possible Air and field help to take Tibet under full control. Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel who was deputy prime minister wrote NEHRU a long letter in Nov. 1950; he implied that Pannikar had had the wool pulled over his eyes by the Chinese whom he accused of perfidy and malevolence for changing the word “sovereignty” to “Suzerainty” and not even holding the independent status of Tibet.

Now Indian Govt. occupied the NEFA region full to the MacMohan line in Feb. 1951 and even captured Tawang despite of opposing by the civilians and providing direct notice to Tibet and not the Chinese who had now taken Tibet under them.

1. In Sept. 1951 Chou En lie suggested the Indian ambassador to clarify all the boundaries with India, Nepal and china and further confirmed that china is willing to accept MacMohan line as the boundary in the east but for that first of all a joint survey and discussion on bench is required. Indian govt. accepted but never followed.


2. China in July 1952 again proposed to fix any pending boundary issues. Mr. G.S Bajpai India’s first Secretary-General wrote a letter to PM stating that there are some issue related to the boundaries in Aksai Chin and NEFA that Chinese govt. had never accepted as they had been between the Tibet and British and not with China. So it’s better to talk to China once as they are now ready to accept the MacMohan line also. But the think tank of NEHRU – Krishna Menon refused badly and it was decided that nothing would be discussed with China related to the NEFA as they felt that they are at better position now and after that they have to leave some parts to China.


3. After the death of Sardar Patel, author told that the whole govt. was NEHRU, MENON and later KAUL joined them. And these three took each and every decision without even consulting the cabinet and even sometimes they didn’t call the panel of Home minister and other senior leaders like Kriplani and lalbahadur.

4. BK Nehru was Ambassador in US (cousin of Nehru) and one more cousin RK Nehru was Sec. Gen. of ministry of external affairs. KAUL was a military person who once gone to Burma with army and never had any experience of wars and enjoying the friendship and power in Delhi.

5. NEHRU is well known for its PanchSheel which he introduced after coming from Indonesia and originally he took two rules out of these from the foreign policy of China itself.

6. Up till 1954 Sikkim was not part of Indian Constitution though it was shown in Indian map of that time; this was accepted by Congress in 1967.

7. Indian Map in 1954 now showed the MacMohan line as Indian boundary in East and in west they showed a color wash instead of any particular boundary in that region as Indian territory, means included the Aksai Chin but without and specific boundary and the same case in some areas with Nepal.

8. The most advance post in the west region was chusul and in 1952 Indian petrol was sent only up to Lanak Pass.

9. NEHRU gave a slogan of HINDI CHINI BHAI-BHAI and had friendship with Chou En Lie according to PanchSheel.

10. July 1954, when army asked about the scene of the disputed boundary near to Himachal, Nepal and china border then the think tank asked them to move forward and so in 1954 Indians rushed into disputed boundary.


11. Author tells that Nehru was “a poor debater, his speeches too long and more like soliloquies than communications, he was a parliamentarian by commitment and not by temperament. Enjoying his dominance in house. ‘Childish’ and ‘infantile’ were favorite words to rebuke the other members. But was afraid of Kriplani and the left leaders during 1957 when kriplani was in opposition as he left congress.


12. In Sept. 1957 the Indian Ambassador in peeking sent a magazine showing some road in Aksai Chin part build by China. Now Nehru Came out of sleep and in 1958 only India Formally claimed Aksai chin as part of India.

13. Interestingly China claimed that even in the Discovery of India Written by Nehru in 1946. He himself had not included Sikkim and NEFA in India.

14. Here one thing to be noted that Nehru was such a big liar that according to the Author he hides many things from the parliament and even lies about the conversation between him and Chou En Lie which were later came out of his letters. The same he did when He was aware and knowingly let the march of Chinese army from Eastern to Western Tibet through so called Indian Aksai Chin in 1953. For 4 years he had hidden this thing from the parliament.

15. He wrote even a single telegram by himself in that period being a single man foreign ministry.
 
16. During this friendship period NEHRU and CHOU EN LIE both visited each other countries and both were given great regard.

17. In 1956 during their meeting Chou En Lie again raised the Mac Mohan Line issue by telling that they had accepted MacMohan line as boundary with Burma and now he wants to accept it with India and so have a discussion on table on that also. This time again Nehru escaped.

18. In 1959 China attacked Tibet Lama and Dalai Lama from the NEFA region run into India and India accepted him and provided DharamShala as his place to establish his territory.


19. Nehru’s diplomatic knowledge can be judged by this statement only. In Sept. 1959 in LokSabha he openly told that,” MacMohan line is by and large fixed except in some parts in Subansiri area and some where varied by us. Even before the war he openly stated that China cannot do such being India not so strong”.


20. By the autumn 1959 Indian troops despite of Chinese opposition fired at them and captured Longju, Migyitum, Tamaden and Khuzemane and established posts there.

21. By this time the pressure in parliament and election made NEHRU a different person and now he started openly saying that Chou cheated him.


22. Looking back at the Indian Scene, Menon and Kaul created such situations that General Thimayya was forced to resign. After that General ManekShaw was blamed and enquiry was applied on him.


23. Overall Letters are there even just before the war China asked to settle disputes and they were openly saying that they can apply the status quo (means jo jahan hai wahan rahe but Nehru and his team never gone on table with them for these issues and now NEHRU in the pressure of elections made sharp and volatile statements that We will not give and inch to China and a great hatred environment was created against China in India. Nehru again won by majority).


24. Now comes the time of 8th Sept. 1962 Nehru was out in common wealth PM’s conference in London and Kaul was away in Kashmir on long leaves even in such tensed situation. And back in Delhi now PM was MENON. Menon on his own called up a meeting (ha ha not of the cabinet and congress leaders) but of SS Khera Cabinet sec. SC sarin and one official Malik. He solely took decision of Eviction and appointed KAUL as the leader in Command bye passing ManekShaw and other seniors than KAUL and it was clear that KAUL has no experience.


25. KAUL immediately called up but he didn’t listen to Menon and he was only brought back after NEHRU came back. He joined Tejpur to command.

The placement of battalions was as follows:

1. On the Namka Chu : 9 Punjab, plus one company of two Rajput.

2. At lumpu : HQ 7 Brigade and 2 companies of Rajput,1/9 Gorkha rifles and a troop of heavy mortar and remainder of machine gun company.

3. At Tawang : 1 Sikh + 4 Garhwal rifles + 4 artillery brigade.

4. Rest of NEFA: under 5 infantry Brigade.

5. 5 JAT infantry was posted in the front in Ladakh.



General Umrao Singh of XXXIII corps and Brigadier Dalvi were leading there and they were very well aware of the situation. Umrao Singh even went back to Lacknow and asked them to reverse or stop the order of Eviction as the situation was totally against them. He had written back to HQ and Ministry but he was not listened. Also adding to this during 1959 crush military demanded of ammunition but NEHRU denied directly that the foreign exchange is very short and they can’t afford.


Umrao Singh was not listened and plans were to shift him back to some other post near to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) but later orders cancelled as his full battalion was there.

When General Prasad and Sen ordered of Eviction Brig. Dalvi told the same as Umrao. According to Dalvi, Prasad told him in Lumphu, “Look here Old boy, no one is interested in your bloody appreciation. They only interested in your D-Day for eviction the Chinese”

The operation was Named Leghorn and they were willing to launch it by Oct. 10. The 7th brigade were having 50 rounds per man and in summer clothing and only one blanket during that winter season. Ammunition and ration was dropped by air but due to bad weather and area only 30% was picked. When Dalvi told Kaul about this Kaul barked on him, “Either picks the rest or Starve”.

Kaul after his air round and looking the situations on the posts went back to Delhi to request NEHRU personally on night 11th Oct. but again Menon and others asked him to go and carry on the operation at the earliest. All were concentrating only on the eastern part and assuming that China will not attack on the western part. This was later accepted by Nehru in Parliament.

War begun and by 25th Oct Tawang was in hands of China in the east and in west on 27th they took Demchok.

Now can you guess where KAUL was? He got bronchitis at once after 4 days of clash and was back to Tejpur and then Delhi and Commanding on Phone from his Delhi residence.

Also after that IV corps got their new commander l-General Harbaksh Singh, Prasad was replaced by General A S Pathania and 62 Birgade was given to JAT Brigadier Hoshier Singh Rathi (Sankhol Wale) who was at BomDi La.

Truth was put forward by General Thimayya when he said, “Every Sepoy in the Army knows that Kaul has never been a combat soldier, you can’t hide that sort of thing in army”. On the other hand our Great PM CHACHA NEHRU JI told in parliament,” I want to mention his name especially because quite extraordinarily unjust things have seen about him. Some people say that he had not experience of fighting. That is not correct.”

Kaul was back to Tejpur on Oct 28th. Each and every Indian Soldier fought bravely lacking full clothes, half ration and even ammunition under the command of good generals now e.g. Brig. KK singh, Dalvi, Umrao Singh, Hoshier Singh and Pathania.

Mahan JAT:


When Pathania proposed withdrawal from Se La, Hoshier Singh Protested that his troops could hold out and the gorkhas were also with them to block the Chinese. But Pathania’s reports also were found unmatching after the war?? Though Hoshier Singh denied withdrawing but under pressure he starts withdrawal and told that it would be disastrous to do it. Wahi hua jo JAT ne kaha tha ….. Chinese attacked by machine guns and the only Party who tried to knock out the Guns was that of Our JAT Leader Hoshier Singh but failed lacking strength. And after a brave fight, this great Soldier Shot Dead at Phutang on November 27th.


After reaching the foot hills China herself declared Cease Fire and by December 8 – 15th were back to their original position but they remained the same in west.

After that Lady Bhandarnaeke of Ceylone(Srilanka) become mediator and even at that time China called a table conf. and written a letter to PM to finalize the boundary disputes but again NEHRU said that first CHINA should withdraw the forces from Aksai Chin and long back to upper MacMohan then only he will talk.

Still now it is unresolved and INDIA is showing both of them in her territory. Aksai Chin is totally in china now and Do not know what is the situation in the East??

This is how INDIA was controlled and ruled by three people up till 1962 (NEHRU, MENON and KAUL).


According to defense ministry released figures:

Killed: 1383
Missing: 1696
Captured: 3968

UN SAB VIRON KO SAT - SAT PRANAM


[ Please correct if anywhere found something ambiguous ]
 
ANY CONTACT WITH 5 Jat BN

Dear BLS Sahib
Have you got any contact with 5 Jat BN in 1962 War ?
Have you got any contact with Brig Hoshiar Singh in life.
Any chapter in your new book about them.
Cheers
 
Sorry Sir

I was not in contact with 5 Jat

The Signal officer of Brig Hoshiar Singh Capt Man , a friend of mine , was killed at Sela. Brig Ratan Singh , who lives in Bombay was the G3 of Brigadier .
Regards Brig lakshman
 
Brig Hoshiar Singh

2255.jpg


The Hero of 1962 Brig Hoshiar Singh commanded my Battalion 2RAJRIF. Here is his picture that we have in our CO's Gallary
 
20 October 62

A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh
 
A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh

I'd like it sir.

Thx,
Ashish
 
It'll be a pleasure to read them,
I also need'em :)

thx!

Rock on
Jit


A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh
 
book

Sorry for the delay in responding . The title of the book is 'Letters From The Border and Other Less told Stories " By Brig Lakshman Singh

The address of the distributer is as under:

Knowledge World
5A/12 Ansari Road
Darya Gang
New Delhi 002
Tele 011 23257714
e mail jagat@del2.vsnl.net.in
 
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