20 October 1962 Sino Indian Conflict

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bls31

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An Extract from My Book BLS

Prelude to the Battle of Namka Chu

2 Rajput that faced the brunt of the initial Chinese attack came on air for about 15 minutes to inform that they were under attack; soon there was this ominous silence. What had transpired was that the battalion’s Signal bunker was demolished by enemy fire killing all including the operators of my section manning the forward link with the battalion. Those dead included Capt Mangat also, the Battalion Signal officer, whom I had met only on the afternoon of 18th, when the Signal Officers of the battalions had been called to Brigade HQ for a coordinating Conference. He was to leave this morning for Poona this day as instructor at national defence Academy.

Mangat had written a letter to Ian Cardazo, his erstwhile roommate at IMA, that aptly describes the situation prevailing and the spirit and morale of the officers and men of 2 Rajput deployed in the RiverNamakchuValley



He wrote: ‘My dear Cardi,
It looks like it is I who will go first into battle. I am not able to tell you where I am but we are just short of the McMahon Line. The Chinese hold the high ground and seem to be in great strength. Should they attack we will defend our territory to our very last breath. It is very cold out here and we do not have snow clothing but we will give the Chinese a hot reception if they dare to attack. Will tell you all about it, IF and WHEN we meet again, I don't know where you are but I wish we were better prepared.
With regards and best wishes
Mahabir’



His room mate, Cardazo, now a retired Maj Gen, with some event triggering a desire, was inspired to write a poem about 1962 and his friend Mangat some times much later:

Prelude to the Battle of Namkachu –1962


Do not wait for me when I am gone​
Duty calls and I must go​
For this last battle was I born​
When our great country’s friend has turned a foe​
Much has happened in recent times gone by​
Blinkered vision blinds our leader’s eyes​
They fail to heed our army’s desperate cry​
Disabled minds prefer our neighbour’s lies​
To understand our Army’s basic need​
Our leaders do not even seem to try​
To do or die has been our basic creed​
And not to question how or when or why​
This brigade is tasked to face first blow​
We fight with old and antiquated arms​
We’re up against a far superior foe​
On ground dictated by their forceful terms​
This battleground in which we now are placed​
Below the enemy’s dominating ground​
A malignant Chinese force is what we face​
With all advantage in their favour found​
Wars only start when leaders fail​
When armies are allowed to lose their strength​
When governance permits itself to become frail​
And fails to execute the role for which it’s meant​
We know that we are in a desperate state​
There is no way that we can save the day​
Leaders far away decide our fate​
Ignorant of the need for better ways ​
To further complicate the game​
The enemy continues to call the shots​
And to our everlasting shame​
We have no game, no plan, no plot​
Daily we see the Chinese army grow​
They now have massed on Upper Thagla hill​
We’re badly placed in positions down below​
No mines, no guns no winter clothing still​
Winter’s cold and icy hand of death​
Has announced its presence in skies no longer blue\​
And all we do is wait with baited breath​
For death to strike across the Namkachu​
When we are gone it’s only this we ask​
A chance to snatch fair victory from the jaws of death​
To give our sons the means so they can do their task​
In defending freedom with every mortal breath

​
What Mangat had feared came true and when the Chinese attacked Seven Brigade on the morning of 20th October 1962, 2 Rajput did fight nearly to the last man ant to Mangat’s last breath. The battalion had faced the brunt of the Chinese attack fought valiantly as apparent from the casualties suffered. From :a strength of 513 in situ it had 282 killed wounded and captured 81, captured unwounded 90 at the end only 60 all ranks managed to get away; mostly JCO’s and Jawans.


There were two Mahabirs /Mahavirs in Namkachu; the other was Mahabir Singh of 1 Sikh, the nephew of Gen Niranjan Prasad the then GOC 4 Div. Mahabir had established the Dhola post and was on attachment with 1/9 GR, as an expert, on orders of The GOC , sadly both perished in the valley of Namkachu.
 
There is no doubts with me that Our troops were in no position to defend during 62 war as Chinese were too far superior and battle worthy at that point of time and that the war was forced on India.In spite of that Our jawans[all ranks] did their best to give them a fight but frankly inspite of a few heroic deeds as brought out by Laxman sir,it was a mass murder of our great soldiers.


Wars can only bring pains and sufferings and nothing else but then where ego to be powerful roost the world,it will be resorted to in some form or other and thus our defense forces need to stay focused,trained,battle worthy and updated with modern trends of warfare and in doing so the Leadership will have a lot at stake.
 
tap .... tap .... tap .... tap .....

my heart goes out for those who laid their live's for US ...... long live hero's of 62 ............ we are in a great debt .... thx for a freedom full life CHAPS ... we wuld'nt have een here had u all not been there on those terrains .........
 
20 October 2006

Story of 2 Lt AJS Behl GPO at Tsangdhar

…..We saw a helicopter approaching the helipad. By that time small arm fire had also started from the black rock area and shelling was also going on. There was no sign of the helicopter taking-off again. I sent a patrol of two men to see what had happened. They came back and told me that that the helicopter was there, and two persons; one pilot and another person in a red turban were lying dead near the helicopter. Next day, when we buried them as prisoners of war (POWs) I could identify one as Sqn Ldr Sehgal and the other as Maj Ram Singh of Signals.

I saw a man crawling towards my gun position and shouting don’t kill me. He came and stood in my trench with me. He was the Battery Havildar Major (BHM) of the mortar battery deployed ahead of us and wanted to know about the latest information. I told him that we were out of communication with any body. While I was explaining the local situation he was hit by small arms fire and died there only. It was a sad end to a keen soldier. The situation had become very desperate. I ordered my two guns to fire on the only area we could see clearly, the black rock by direct firing. We fired about 10 rounds per gun. By this time it was getting to be mid-day, we saw another helicopter approaching our position but it went away while it was half way to Tsangdhar, I am sure it must have been hit by the Chinese MMG fire from ground either from the black rock area or spurs right of Tsangdhar. By this time the small arms fire from the black rock (the dominating feature on our left) had increased.

…..I felt proud of my troop everybody wanted to fight it out at the gun position.

The enemy was closing in but the ground was such that much of the direct artillery fire was not possible. We still fired about 20 rounds per gun towards black rock and beyond supply point. The melee of the battle was confusing; our personnel withdrawing, Chinese devastating shelling and small arms firing. My three LMGs were firing and we were using our personal weapons.

….I will say this with pride that at no stage did any of my jawans suggested to me that we should withdraw or tried to runaway from the fight, though three jawans had died by this time, they all obeyed me till the end. They saw a large number of all ranks running past our gun position but not even one person deserted.
(Shades of the Boy named Casabianca from he poem by Feliacia Hemans ;
Quote The boy stood on the burning deck,
Whence all but him had fled Unquote. -Author)

Our stubborn resistance came to an end by about by about 3-4 PM and it changed our position from proud soldiers to helpless prisoners. We were made to stay at Tsangdhar that night and next morning, I buried Sqn Ldr Sehgal and Maj Ram Singh with all the military respect I could manage.

I was shocked to realise that I was a prisoner of war but felt consoled in my own way that all my jawans had stood by my orders and fought to the last. Even during the period we were prisoners in Tibet, their loyalty and discipline remained above board and exemplary at position where not even one person deserted.



An Extract from My earlier book 'Letters from the Border and other Less Told Stories ' BLS
 
1962

Some thing that I had to write; I could not take the remark addressed to My commander BLs

The Plastic Soldier​

The other day while in the Noida Golf Course for an evening of socialising; now long retired, then Captains and Lieutenants during the time of the 1962 Sino Indian conflict in NEFA, the conversation somehow veered to our personal experiences of those days.

I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade that faced the brunt of the Chinese attack, commanded by Brig JP Dalvi and I casually mentioned about my book ‘Letters from the Border’ about my experiences of the Operation Leghorn released a few years back.
Looking at me one of us queried, ‘How was Brig Dalvi?’ ‘He was a nice person.’ I spontaneously responded.

‘No,’ he insisted ‘but how was he as a Soldier?’ Even before I could respond, another present injected, ‘He was a ‘Plastic Soldier’

Having been a close witness to what had been happening to him as the commander of the ill fated brigade and his troops beginning the 8th of October and culminating in the decimating of the Brigade on the 20th October 1962, this sudden and unexpected assault took me aback,

I wondered as to what was implied by the sobriquet ‘Plastic Soldier.’ Was Dalvi ever allowed to do ‘Soldering’ and what soldering is as the brigade commander’s level? Forget about soldering, the question remains was he even allowed exercising command? Dalvi, in any case had done enough soldering in his life at the level where real soldering is done; serving with Baluch regiment during the Second World War being also mentioned in despatches for gallantry. And later having two command tenures first that of the 4th Battalion of Guards and later the 1st Guards.

If he was at all plastic it was not by character but by the constant battering from the higher commanders that made him in to a foil with no elasticity left. In their wisdom they ensured that he remained away from his HQ, staff, and communications, either on move or sitting in wilderness with his GSO 3, the intelligence officer, the rover operator, the cipher operator and the radio mechanic for company for days together. The man pack Radio Set no 62 which could be operated only when static on the Brigade Command net as his only link with the out side world. He was denied any decision making authority, the brigade was moved forward from the concentration area at Lumpu to Tsangdhar and the valley of River Namka Chu with out his knowledge. As the matter stood the command of the brigade was being exercised, even a day earlier to 20th October, from thousands of miles away from the place of operation by the Corps Commanded lying on his sick-bed in Delhi.

If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.
 
India China hostilities are bound to increase with time. High time we Indians realise this truth, else we will face another 1962 situation, Here as an article I was going through, which I thought I must share with you all;

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=695&language_id=1

Chinese have penetrated much deeper in India now through their CPM friends. Then they are getting stronger in Nepal through maoists. India is almost getting encircled by Chinese once again and Indians are sleeping. Time to wake up my friends...

RK^2
 
Chinese have penetrated much deeper in India now through their CPM friends. Then they are getting stronger in Nepal through maoists. India is almost getting encircled by Chinese once again and Indians are sleeping. Time to wake up my friends...

RK^2

Not only that, China is sitting on our eastern borders - in Burma (Myanmar) and very near to Andaman & Nicobar. On the West, it has made friendly ties with Pakistan and helping it in anti-India activities. China has also helped Pakistan to develop the naval port of Gwadar in Arabian Sea, a potential threat to India. China is using the port of Karachi for some of its imports and then transporting the goods by road, through famous silk route, passing through Pak-occupied Kashmir. The enemies are getting stronger.
.
 
Not only that, stronger.
.

Off topic. However, I want to ask one thing. We have 3rd Largest army and we have hostile neighbouerers. Does that make sense to involve in Burma and try to show to the world that we support democracy.

I think this move will provide safegaurds from china in North East. I think its time to move ahead.
 
Who Attacked who

It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit
 
Off topic. However, I want to ask one thing. We have 3rd Largest army and we have hostile neighbouerers. Does that make sense to involve in Burma and try to show to the world that we support democracy.

I think this move will provide safegaurds from china in North East. I think its time to move ahead.

I would agree to you. Time has come when we have to act decisively against chinese game plan. China is our enemy number one and better we teat them so. I think India sending army in Mynamar will do a great deal of good for our international image. Action has to be swift and decisive.

RK^2
 
It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit

Hi Amit,

Can you please let me have the links to this information.

Thanks
Rajendra
 
Daac Saab Ram Ram!

I don't agree with spreading violence on the pretext of stopping it. Why would you to send down our kids to kill (OK at least say....keep peace) theirs for no reason and then you spend lacs on their funeral back home...why...why all this?

A
 

Chillar sir, Even i am not in a favour of direct confortation with China.
They have direct and strong involvment with Pakistan.. So Western borders are not safe.
North-East is China herself.
They are building army bases in Indian ocean. So, we have to act first and act fast for our safeguards.
We can't follow the model of Japan to be a puppet of America.
 
Daac Saab Ram Ram!

I don't agree with spreading violence on the pretext of stopping it. Why would you to send down our kids to kill (OK at least say....keep peace) theirs for no reason and then you spend lacs on their funeral back home...why...why all this?

A

In that case we wait till Chinese and their maoist and CPM agents surround our homes and towns. They are doing it. Peace is a very expensive commodity and nation has to pay for it. India did not invite British. Stupid Mughals looked otherway to their activities and we all know what happened. We lost or respect and lives both.

RK^2
 
1962

Who Attacked Whom

Extract from my Book Letters From the Border: BLS

SEALING THE LIE


The fact is that on the 19th evening India had no plan to attack across the river Namak Chu, If there was any plan, it was that of the Chinese, following the plan the Chinese told the world that
‘At 7 O’ Clock (Peking time) in the morning of 20thOctober the aggressive Indian forces, under cover of fierce artillery fire launched massive attacks against the Chinese Frontier Guards’

The Times of India dated 28 May 1998 had published a letter from me to editor titled ‘Sealing a Lie ‘ which highlighted the above fact. Quote, I was the signal officer of the late Brigadier J P Dalvi’s ill-fated 7 Brigade deployed in Namka Chu Valley in NEFA, and which faced the brunt of the massive Chinese attack in 1962.The then Lt Col K K Tewari, CO 4th Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, came to visit me in the Bde HQ on October 18,1962. He, among other things, asked me to work out the leave plans of my section. He was captured by the Chinese on the morning of October 20,1962,in the forward infantry battalion location which he was visiting.

The point to note is that formations that are planning attack do not plan leave for its personnel. The Commander Signals of the division also remains with the divisional HQ to control and execute the overall communication plan and does no go and stay with the forward most infantry battalion on the eve of the attack.
This should seal the Chinese lie-if it has not been sealed yet-that India attacked the Chinese Frontier Guards on October 20,1962.
Brig Lakshman Singh, New Delhi, -Unquote.
 
20 october

18th October 1962

The thinking of Young officers from the story of Young Kahlon( Now retired as Lt General) as recorded in my book "letters from the Border" BLS



Kahlon reached the Battalion HQ at Bridge I on Namka Chu in company of a link patrol on the evening of 16 October 1962. As generally happens in the Army so often, having just returned from the D&M course was appointed the IO (Intelligence Office) of the Battalion.


Gen Kahlon continued the narration: The whole battalion was huddled behind boulders in a small area, I wonder if any one was beyond 200 yards. We were at the lowest point of the valley with hand built 'Sangars' as our only protection from the enemy and the elements. Thagla rose Phoenix like, steep and tall just across the river. Was it the PM's instructions that ''Indian Army should occupy the forward most inch of Indian soil'' that had forced the commanders to sit in such a hopeless defensive posture or what. No ArmySchool talked about such defensive position. What then forced us in such a self-defeating position? With hindsight no one from political hierarchy to commanders on the ground took the Chinese that seriously. Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai was too seriously imbedded in our psyche. (Years later our PM's Lahore Yatra had similarly contributed to the Kargil fiasco)

The only support weapons of battalion 3'' Mortars were almost non-existent. Though our boys had carried four tubes all the way, we had no bombs. One Arty OP party had come in possibly the same morning. However with half the 17 Para field guns dropped to support the Brigade having been lost during the para drop there was no Artillery support available. So far as the communication was concerned, one telephone line ran along the river (Nullah) as an omnibus circuit when the phone ran it took us good 5 minutes to sort out who was calling whom. (Possibly he was referring to the lateral line to 9 Punjab. Many unconventional things were happening the Punjabis and the Grenadiers had 'Teed' in to the line running from the Brigade exchange to the Div TAC HQ in a clandestine manner. A fact that came to light only on the 20th October, when the Chinese launched their attack). Oblivious of all these snags I was happy to be home with the Paltan and spent the my day in going from Sanghar to Sanghar meeting officers and men and running errands for Maj Oscar Thomas, our Adjutant.

Bridge I was closest to the HatunglaPass over which crossed the old trade track. Next to us on the left were the Punjabis.

Lunch in the Brigade HQ

The very next day that is on the 18th I was summoned, along the IO's of the other Battalions by the Brigade Major.
'Come for a conference at the HQ, tomorrow morning at
10 O' clock. You guys are talking about so much Chinese movement opposite you. Let us take stock.' I called 2 Lt Naveen Kohli, a course junior to me, and the IO of the Punjabi .to guide me since I was new. We agreed to walk up together to the
Brigade HQ,
Naveen told me that he was not from an affluent family. Since his commissioning he was struck here in NEFA and had seen no life though he had ended up saving some money.''On 10th October during the Tseng Jong operations undertaken by the battalion I saw six foot tall Khalsas drop like bananas with a bullet through them realised how fragile a man is"
Two youngsters in early twenties discussing life!
As Naveen continued, he became philosophical,
' Now I believe that one should live life for the day one is alive, who knows if there is going to be a tomorrow. I am expecting to proceed on casual leave, this time I have decided to paint Delhi red. Little did he know that the sands of his life were running fast with just a couple of day's worth of particles left in the glass to flow down.

Sadly, his small wish to paint Delhi remained unfulfilled.
2 Lt Naveen died during the withdrawal on the 21 of October and was awarded VrC posthumously.

 
An extract from Kahlon's story from the book
BLS

One Death and the Bottle of Rum

Night over took us and brought with it additional chill and cold that a night of late October coupled with an altitude of 15-16,000 feet altitude can manifest. To top it, there was soon sleet and fresh snow and this was clearly the coldest night that we had spent in the open.
That night two things happened that will always live with me. One Ganpat died, he froze stiff, sitting in the snow, as he was. Before his death he cried and howled like an animal unknowingly, the rest of us yelling at him to keep quiet lest the Chinese pick up our trail. Rajamani Rai was 'B " Company barber and having 'managed' his enrollment, was much older, nearly 50 years of age. He had against all advice to accompany the Paltan to NEFA rather than take the easy way out and get posted to Centre.

The second was a coincidence when I ran into Hav Chhetri of 1/9 GR who only two months ago had taught me at the Army School of Mechanical Transport. Faizabad. He had been recalled to the unit to take his promotion test and destiny had made him cross my path. He was sitting in the snow, having recognised me he wished me. Surprised to see him in our midst I offered that he share my blanket as he had none. Huddled under the blanket, Chhatri some time later asked me if I would have rum. Imagine my surprise, he was prepared to share what could be life saving under the circumstances there were no barriers. The Saihab and the Jawan spent the night under the saihabs blanket taking swigs from the bottle produced by the Jawan.Both survived the ordeal.

For the next couple of days we were totally lost and kept wandering aimlessly. Oscar assumed the leadership of he group, as it was too much for Maj Balbir the senior most officer. I remember Oscar was enthused, as he had not seen his newborn daughter born after three sons. He kept mumbling to himself that he had to get out and see the child and thus ended up leading us all and those who survived to safety.

Courtesy All India Radio and a transistor radio which Capt Chander Nagarani had been presented by his brother, who was in the Navy, we were kept informed of the Chinese progress. The Chinese were by this time in Tawang using the old Bumla -Tawang. trade route.
 
A good writeup, about an excellent topic.

Properly this should be in the History section.

There are many many questions, about this subject, and this will raise much passion I am sure.

I read a book recently, " THE UNFORGOTTEN WAR" by Col. Saighal.

It is out of print now,

I will post full details later.

Col. Saighal was a Signals officer,or ASC If I recall corectly.

His version is markedly different from the official version, we were fed.

For one, he does bring out some points- how was it that the chinese, without any heavy arms, facing a powerful Indian army , who were in mountain country, in strong defensive positions, routed the Indians.

The strong defensive positions, e.g Se la
( the Se Pass), were adequately supplied. and should have been a veritable thorn in the side of the Chinese, who could only bypass it
on foot, with light arms.


The Indian Army had tanks,.

There was a panic and a rout.

One of my uncles, Col R S Sirohi( now retired) of 5th Dogra, also survived this ardous and dangerous trek out.

In Hindsight, there is always 20/20 vision and I must be diffident in raising these topics .

This is not questioning the bravery of the Individual soldier, and the junior officers, which needs no defence.

Mine, as some know, is a historical interest, and I do like going deep into a historical subject .

If Brigadier Singh,( who would have been a junior officer then) is able to shed some more historical detail, this would be much appreciated.

Best regards


Ravi Chaudhary
 
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Sehgal was a Gunner . I cant say much about Sela debacle . I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade on the tri junction of Bhutan Tibet and India , the are from my earlier book Letters from the Border and other Less Told stories. BLS
 
Who Attacked Who...!

Chillar Bhai,

Some correction to what you said.

It was not the 'stupidity' of our soldiers; yes if there was some stupidity from any side it was from Mr Nehru (who was not aware of what's happening) and Menon, the defence minister. That was rather immaterial as the Chinese in any case were not sitting on the LC for singing 'bhajans'

You'll be surprised to know that the orders to 'evacuate Chinese' came from a defense secretary as both PM & RM were out of country at that point of time. It is high time we give what is due to our Army; till date it has never raised any question on the decision given by the govt. Otherwise there would have been no difference between India & Pakistan.

Brig Lakshman can correct me if factually something is wrong.




It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit
 
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