20 October 1962 Sino Indian Conflict

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20 october

Another extract from my book BLS



The Saturday Syndrome


It would be interesting to recall as to who was where on 8 September as information about the Chinese surrounding the Dhola post moved up the chain of command.

When the message was received in the Brigade HQ, both the BM and the DQ, along with the rest of brigade staff were guests at a Bara Khana in one of the battalions. The Brigade Duty Officer and I the Signal officer had gone for a post lunch walk. The Commander was at Tezpur en-route to Meerut, his leave station.

The Divisional Commander Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was at Thakurbari Planters Club, enjoying a cinema show. Lt Col Manohar Singh the GSO I was away on a course. Other Officers at Corps and Command, I presume must also have been involved in recreational activities like others on a typical Saturday.

Lt Gen BM Kaul, the Chief of General Staff was on annual leave in Kashmir. DMO Brig Palit was preparing to go on a naval cruise the next morning with Members of Parliament. COAS General Thapar was unreachable, as he was entertaining guests at a dinner.

The Prime Minister Pandit Nehru was out of the country attending the commonwealth ministers conference in London with Morarji Desai his finance minister. The Defence minister Krishna Menon was preoccupied with his forthcoming visit to the UN It was an intelligence coup of the first order by the Chinese who seemed to know the habits of Indians in position not to take decisions on a Saturday.

Again it was a Saturday on the 20th of October when the Chinese attacked us across River Namka Chu. However, this time at least we- those of the Seven Brigade were not in a Saturday mood, albeit equally unprepared.

 
Dear Brigadierji

Could you please post details of book availability, price, publisher, book seller?

I would like very much like to have a copy.

In fact, I would be happy to send you the money, if you could post me a copy


Ravi Chaudhary
 
An Interesting Topic!

Dear Members,


It is an interesting topic and more so to a soldier. There are two issues here. One is historical perspective, which has been adequately elaborated by Birg Laxman Singh. The second one is the current and future perspective which probably would be more pertinent in todays context.


While it would be of great interest to Ravi who is known for his passion for historty to know the historical perspective, it would be of equally imprtance to the future generations to know the current and futuristic view.


History is very important for it lays down the path for future. While defeat may be bitter, it is defeat that probably teaches us more lessons than the victory. What went wrong?


I can keep writing on this subject. But to put the things in simplest form, I would say only one thing. We need "TIGERS" to commnad us and not the "COWS" to command us. It is the duty of a soldier to obey the order given by his seniors, but a good soldier should question that order atleast once to inform the senior that it probably is not the best order. How many of our distinguished military leaders did that in 1962? Probably a good question to discuss.


While Mr. Nehru might have said to occupy the forward most inch of ground of the Nation, a good military commander needs to analyze the order and implement it to get the desired result. If physical occupation of the forward most piece of ground results in a tactical disadvantage, then the good officer must occupy a tactically strong position that can defend the forward most inch of the ground. That is the true implementation of the order.

The point here is that I am neither Nehru's fan nor I am a diehard cirtique. What I want to bring out here is that the tactics is some thing that a soldier is trained for and while Political leadership may be supreem it is the soldier who needs to educate the political leaders about the tactical situation. If there is a confrontation that results at this time, then a true soldier must resign his position rather than becoming party to the loss of thousands of lives of the soldiers who trusted him. Probably that did not happen, it probably may not happen in most cases as many in higher ranks in past, currently as well as in future will look for green pastures after retirement.


We can keep blaming the politicians, but, the commanders at ground probably have to share equal responsibility for the disaster for it was their duty also to put their foot down. We as a soldier have our loyalty to the nation, then to the soliders we command. Our own personal interests come last always and every time. That is the oath an Indian Army Officer takes when he takes the last step at Chetwood Building at IMA. By obeying a tactically and strategically wrong political order, a commander has failed in his duty. To me it is betrayal of faith of thousands of soldiers whom we command and who give their life on our orders. I personally feel that as an officer our responsibility is much beyond following the orders. We do need to analyze them and weigh them rationally in a strategic and tactical scenario that is practical.


Time permitting I shall continue. It had happened to me during my service and I am very proud till date that God gave me enough strength to take such steps. The good thing is that the senior officers not only listened to me, but also appreciated when such views were expressed. More often than not it is our own weakness that prevents us from speaking the truth. To achieve that one needs to be professionally competent and that not only requires burning of midnight oil, but also a keen eye on your profession.
 
And What were the Better Things?

chhillar said:
It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit
Click to expand...

Dear Amit Ji,


I really don't know from where your facts are coming from or that matter what you mean to say about violence and other thing you have mentioned in your other post on this subject.

The issue are here different.


45 years have passed since 1962. There will always be different versions of the account from different people. That is why you call a phrase " The war as I saw it"? There will always be different perceptions. The one of Intelligence Officer of an Infantry Bn would be different than of a Commanding Officer of the Bn. Similary it will be different of a Signal Officer and Arty OP than a Infantry Company Commander or a Tank Regiment's Squadren Commander.

The problem here is that many sitting thousands of miles away in cozy room in a metro, make most authentic version and some times challenge the soldier's version.


It really does not matter, as to who attacked whom? The fact of the matter is that our senior leadership both Political as well as military failed us. As Field Martial Sir, William Slim has said in his famous book "Defeat into Victory", that "Defeat is bitter, but terribly bitter for a commander. A soldier can comfort himself with the thought of doing his duty with best of his ability in a war, no matter on which side he lands up. But for commander if he has been defeated, than he has not done his duty. It is so true.


Some times when I read different versions, a famous quote comes to my mind:


"the trouble with the world is that Stupids are cocksure and intelligents are full of doubt".
 
ye kaun chitrakar hai???

It really does not matter, as to who attacked whom? The fact of the matter is that our senior leadership both Political as well as military failed us. As Field Martial Sir, William Slim has said in his famous book "Defeat into Victory", that "Defeat is bitter, but terribly bitter for a commander. A soldier can comfort himself with the thought of doing his duty with best of his ability in a war, no matter on which side he lands up. But for commander if he has been defeated, than he has not done his duty. It is so true.


Some times when I read different versions, a famous quote comes to my mind:


"the trouble with the world is that Stupids are cocksure and intelligents are full of doubt".

so nicely written, Sir
 
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20 October

Speaking of History and its importance an extract from the prologue of the book BLS



There is a very scanty coverage of Signals in the so far recorded history and other accounts of the Sino-Indian conflict. Even the Corps of Signals History dismisses the whole operation in half a paragraph.

Maj Gen KK Tewari the then CO of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, in his book ‘A Soldier’s Voyage of Self Discovery’ has been more than modest about the achievements of his Regiment. Possibly because the theme of his book is more on the spiritual aspects of his experience, of-course he has been more than kind to me and the men of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Section.

A well-recorded history inspires and motivates the later generations. The sacrifice of officers and men deserves to be remembered, as otherwise their effort would have been in vain.
 
Heros of the War: Two Brig Hoshiyar Singh

anrtish said:
One road is there in delhi after brigadier Hoshiar Singh who died in this war.
Click to expand...

Dear Members,

There are two Brig Hoshiyar Singh who became the National Hero, one in 1962 and another in 1971

I was in First Grade when 1962 war took place. I remember Brig Hoshiyar Singh, MVC since then. As luck could have it, I was commissioned in the same battalion as Late Brig Hoshiyar Singh, MVC. Brig Hoshiyar Singh Commanded 2 Raj Rif twice. There was a very famous photo of his that was published in news papers during 1962. I am very proud to share the same rouge's gallary in the Battalion.

Another Brig Hoshiyar Singh is from Granadiers. He won the PVC in 1971. I missed him in IMA. When I joined IMA, he was just posted out from there. We heard so many stories about him at IMA. He was also an outstanding Volleyball players. I don't know where he has settled down, but if he is reading this website, we would request him to contribute his experiences of 1971.
 
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1962

I had a cursory look at the official history, the facts appear to be correct but the deductions questionable. Dalvi , the brigade commander has his both hands tied, it stands to reason no commander if given half a chance would like to deploy his troops while being dominated by the enemy on high ground ,in so far as defensive deployment the troops had no digging tools, no barbed wire and no mines, there was no artillery support and the close air support was conspicuous with its absence even though we had FOOs, GLOs and ground to air communication sets.

About the Sela debacle i lost my friend Capt Mann the Signal officer to Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh. Fortunately , another friend Ratan Singh his G3 survived BLS
 
Sometimes things go wrong, terribly wrong.

In a nutshell that is my view of the 1962 disaster on the war with the Chinese. Things just went terribly wrong.

They were not done with intent, and the officers who led our troops, were not incompetent. They had had successful careers. Many were decorated soldiers.

Things just went wrong.Tragically so.

Sometimes this happens!

I cannot help but review, some thoughts, that creep up now and then.

When the 1962 events occurred, I was in school, all of 15.

The events were even then to me a shock, each day we would read, how our troops were withdrawing to “prepared positions.” Names like ‘Se la’, Bomdila’ became part of our vocabulary. I sometimes wondered why they called it the Sela pass, when ‘la’ meant a pass.

We had news of wave attacks by an indefatigable Chinese army, whose soldiers appeared to be like supermen. Waves that simply could not be faced, and these supermen would throw away their lives until our troops ran out or ammunition.

There was news of Tezpur in Assam being evacuated, with the civil servants fleeing to safer cities. It appeared the Chinese juggernaut would never stop.

All of a sudden it ended- the Chinese withdrew.

One my school friends, Michael Dalvi’s father Then Brigadier Dalvi, was reported captured, and for all of us it came a very personal issue.

Time passed, and for a school boy, other priorities continued,- the war then drifted into the background.

We heard of how the Indian army was outgunned. Our troops had no supplies, no ammunition, and worse they were in their plains uniforms made of cotton, having been rushed up to defend our motherland.

Reports were being written, the name Henderson Brookes, came into the fore, but no report ever came.

Some of my family who had survived the debacle, told us accounts of the difficult time they had trying to escape to safety. I was just glad they had survived.

My education continued, and in 1965 I was in 2nd year university in St. Stephens, Delhi, and 1965 came. The 1965 war with Pakistan put 1962 into the shadow, and the performance of our armed foes, made the memories of that disaster, fade away.

Later came 1971, a success story. The ghosts of 1962 had been laid to rest.

The Indian armed forces following 1962, reorganized, new weapons introduced. In the north, a new arm, Mountain Divisions were created.

Not many may know this, but there had been many Chinese incursion, attempts in the north, and they were soundly beaten back- 1967, 1984.

Our armed forces, the shield of our nation, had reorganized themselves and were once more a force to be reckoned with.

In a nutshell that is my bird’s eye view, looking back over the last four decades.

Today,almost 50 years later, as a nation, I think we have the confidence, we can look into these past events, and bring matters into the open.
 
1962

I am more of technical staff officer with a MSc and five years with DRDo and thirty years with the corps of signal. also as a fellow of IETE and Council member responsible for the E learning. if interested you may like to visit he Portal developed under my guidance iete-elan.ac.in

It would be be a privilege to join your history group but I am much of a historian I have written my personal account in both the books.

Yes Sela was a shame and I felt ashamed on 21 st Non of 1962. Though Seven Brigade was trounced right and proper n I never felt ashamed of my self and the troops that too part in the OP Leghorn.

Let me once again post 'The Plastic Soldier'

The Plastic Soldier

The other day while in the Noida Golf Course for an evening of socialising; now long retired, then Captains and Lieutenants all veterans of the 1962 Sino Indian conflict in NEFA, the conversation somehow veered to our personal experiences of those days.
I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade that faced the brunt of the Chinese attack, commanded by Brig JP Dalvi and I casually mentioned about my book, ‘Letters from the Border’, about my experiences of the Operation Leghorn as the Seven Brigade operation was named .
Looking at me one of us queried, ‘How was Brig Dalvi?’ ‘He was a nice person.’ I spontaneously responded.
‘No,’ he insisted ‘but how was he as a Soldier?’ Even before I could respond, another present injected, ‘He was a ‘Plastic Soldier.’
Having been a close witness to what had been happening to him as the commander of the ill fated brigade and his troops beginning the 8th of October and culminating in the decimating of the Brigade on the 20th October 1962, this sudden and unexpected assault took me aback, I wondered as to what was implied by the sobriquet ‘Plastic Soldier.’ Was Dalvi ever allowed to do ‘Soldering’ and what soldering is as the brigade commander’s level? Forget about soldering, the question remains was he even allowed exercising command? Dalvi, in any case had done enough soldering in his life at the level where real soldering is done; serving with Baluch regiment during the Second World War being also mentioned in despatches for gallantry. And later having two command tenures first that of the 4th Battalion of Guards and later the 1st Guards.
If he was at all plastic it was not by character but by the constant battering from the higher commanders that made him in to a thin foil with no elasticity left. In their wisdom, the higher-ups ensured that Dalvi remained divorced from his HQ, staff and communications. He was either on move or sitting in wilderness with his GSO 3, the intelligence officer, the rover radio-set operator, the cipher operator and the radio mechanic for company for days together. The man pack Radio Set no 62 which could be operated only when static on the Brigade Command net was his sole link with the out side world. He was denied any decision making authority, even the brigade was moved forward from the concentration area at Lumpu to Tsangdhar and the valley of River Namka Chu with out his knowledge by the new Corps Commander
As the matter stood the command of the brigade was being exercised, even a day earlier to 20th October, from thousands of miles away from the place of operation by the Corps Commanded lying on his sick-bed in Delhi. This view is reinforced by what Capt HS Talwar, the trop commander of 17 Para Field, who had drifted that evening in the brigade HQ had to say: ‘That night (19 October) I had a meal in the Brigade Mess bunker in the company of six to seven officers. The gathering included the Commander Brig Dalvi, the Brigade Major Rex Kharbanda, the DAA & QMG Pereira the IO Capt Tushar Gupta, the Signals officer Capt Lakshman and the OC Mortar Battery Maj Balraj Nijjer. In the midst of this setting, the shrill ring of the Telephone Type J, interrupted the proceedings to indicate that the GOC, Niranjan Prasad, wanted to speak to he Brigade Commander Dalvi. The GOC wanted another company strength or so to be moved to Tsangle, besides the platoon of 1/9 GR which was already on the way. Dalvi was seemingly not prepared to accept this order on grounds that Tsangle out-post had no Tactical significance and was an additional drain on the stretched administrative resources of the Brigade. Some hot words were exchanged and in exasperation Dalvi offered to resign from the command of 7 Brigade. I was a complete outsider and witnessed the whole drama with a degree of detachment.
If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.

Brig Lakshman Singh VSM (Retired)
P 539 sector 21 Noida

Lakshman31@gmail.com
 
Contrast, the actions of a commander like Sundarji those of the 1962 top brass.

Contrast the actions of rajiv Gandhi with those of his father J . Nehru

Decisive leadership has no substitute

Ravi



http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/sundarji.html


Sundarji's place in history will probably rest on the lesser-known "Operation Falcon".


Spooked by the Chinese occupation of Sumdorong Chu in 1986, Sundarji used the air force's new air-lift capability to land a brigade in Zimithang, north of Tawang. Indian forces took up positions on the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu river, the site of India's humiliating 1962 defeat and manned defences across the McMahon Line. Taken aback, the Chinese responded with a counter-build-up and in early 1987 Beijing's tone became ominously similar to that of 1962. Western diplomats predicted war and prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's advisers charged that Sundarji's recklessness was responsible for this. But the general stood firm, at one point telling a senior Rajiv aide, "Please make alternate arrangements if you think you are not getting adequate professional advice." The civilians backed off, so did the Chinese.
 
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If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.

Brig Lakshman Singh VSM (Retired)

He was not plastic. Just put into an impossible situation.

His superior Niranjan Prasad, performed badly then and badly in 1965.

One supsects, that the Indian Army generals of the time, the Intelligence, the bureucrats, either agreed with the political leaders ( Nehru, Menon etc) policies, or did not have the nerve and courage to stand upto them.

Ravi Chaudhary
 
1962

Niranjan Prasad lives in NODA,He had no authority during the whole of OP Leghorn, It was Kaul who had browbeaten every one from the poor major, the BM of the 7 Brigade, moved the brigade in to the valley of death with out the knowledge of The Commander. Kaul was also responsible for the Death of Maj Choudhry and other brave solders of 9 Punjab for the failed operation against the Chinese on 10th October. Yes Prasad could have resigned, a difficult proposition for a solder Bls
 
On Gen. Niranjan Prasad, let me correct myself.

I do not wish to judge him.

The public perception, was that he did not perform well in both actions.

He was blamed for not continuing beyond Ichogil. OTH, if his instructions were not to continue, then he would be correctly be just following his instructions.

Ditto for 1962, everyone was confused, as direction from the top was severely lacking.

Sometimes this is just bad luck.


Ravi
 
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