INDIA’S FAUJ
Who rules it?
By
Maj Gen S.G.Vombatkere (Retd)**
Many people agree in private but (especially those in power) refuse to admit in public that the Indian Defence Forces comprising the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force (or, briefly, India’s “fauj”) are not treated fairly by government. Of course, there is the fringe opinion that the fauj lives in luxury and is even overpaid, when they observe things like availability of canteen facilities (especially liquor) and the period of leave admissible in a year. They obviously know nothing at all about the risks and hardships that Jawans and young officers face in daily life.
But what risk does the fauj face in peacetime? Actually the word “peacetime” used as the antonym of “wartime” is quite inappropriate, because even if India is not at war with any country, the conditions of service in countering insurgency are just as risky as any wartime deployment if not actually more so. Today, the fauj loses on average one man every day to militant action. And hardship? Even if the subhuman conditions of mere survival on the Siachen Glacier are omitted, there are severe hardships, both physical and mental, in manning posts on the borders and even in participation in military exercises from bases in “peace stations”.
The fauj consists of about 1.4 million personnel below officer rank (PBOR), with leadership provided by about 50,000 officers instead of 65,000 required, the greatest shortage (11,238 against 46,615 sanctioned) being in the army. The actual fighting is done by the PBOR but under the leadership of officers who, in the Indian fauj, have always led from the front, as statistics of officer versus PBOR casualties in operations have always shown. But without PBOR there would be no need for officers and without leadership, PBOR would be ineffective – it is the combination of the two with the right kind of weaponry, equipment, training, and motivation that can maintain India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the primary responsibility of the fauj. It is said that the man behind the gun is at least as important as the gun itself, which means to say that superior military technology by itself may win battles but cannot win wars unless the fauji (the soldier, a generic term that includes PBOR and officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force) is adequately equipped, trained and motivated. The examples of the US military in Vietnam and in Afghanistan and Iraq bear testimony to this military truth.
The important factor is that of motivation. It is not easily comprehensible to a civilian that motivation is essential to a fauji to fight when ordered and risk life or serious permanent disability. Motivation comes from a combination of regimental spirit, confidence in leadership and training, and most importantly from self-esteem that comes from the way in which the fauji is treated within the service and also outside in “civvy street”, both when in service and after retirement. Here, “treated” means and includes how much he is paid, what perks he receives and how he is treated by government officials when he is on duty and on leave in official and personal dealings. When the present writer was a young officer in the 1960s, a letter to the DC requesting expeditious disposal of a Jawan’s application was sometimes honoured. The need for such a letter itself showed that disposal of faujis’ applications received little attention, but at least a young officer’s letter received some attention. However in the 1990s, even personal meeting with civilian officials when I was much senior in rank (again not requesting a favour but only for just disposal) did not have much effect. This demonstrates how bureaucrats’ treatment of faujis has deteriorated over the years. This is not to say that all bureaucrats are insensitive to the fauj, since there are notable exceptions, but they are few and far between. So, the deterioration is not merely at individual levels, but is at system level.
This is borne out by some cases that I handled when I was Additional DG in charge of Discipline & Vigilance at Army HQ in the 1990s, and which will bear quoting as examples. In July 1995, Lt Bhaduria who visited the office of DC Bomdila in connection with a court case, sought appointment with the DC from the PA who asked him to come later, and when he came later, was indifferent and then rude, declining to give an appointment. Later, he was shouted at by the DC because he had told the DC’s PA to speak with due respect, and when he tried to explain the matter to the DC, he was ordered to leave the DC’s office and was served with an order fining him Rs.1,000 and in default, simple imprisonment of one month. Whether this case was resolved or not, it is quoted to show the attitude of bureaucrats and even their minor functionaries towards faujis. The firing by police at unarmed army leave personnel (resulting in death of two Jawans) at Lumding railway station in June 1993, and the kidnapping and murder of two children of a Havildar at Golconda in January 1994, both widely reported in the media, and the devious and delaying action by bureaucracy and police in both cases further demonstrate their attitude. It is too easy to blame senior officers in the fauj for not taking up these cases forcefully, but the sense of justice and national interest among the “steel frame” has never been to the extent that they would hold one of their own clan guilty. These cases and others taken up with state and central governments bear witness to the low esteem in which bureaucrats hold the fauj in general. This cannot be in the national interest.
What is not understood by bureaucrats is that such treatment of faujis, far from merely causing them hardship, actually demotivates them. Today the Jawan knows that his officer can do little for him in his personal affairs as shown in the above cases. Thus the leadership of the fauji officer is limited to the four walls of the Army Act (or Navy or Air Force Act) and even this is eroded when government summarily dismisses a Chief of Staff. This is not to say that the cabinet is not supreme – it is, and should remain so – but it is to regret the lack of understanding of leadership issues as they concern the fauj at the highest political and bureaucratic levels, since Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat could just as easily have been discreetly ordered to resign rather than crudely dismissed, with negative repercussions on fauji morale.
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